## Adv Proper

### Terror---1AR

## Dedev

### Link---1AR

### 1AR---Sustainability

### Climate

### AT AI

#### It’s science fiction. Trust humans!

Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie 23, investigating expert opinions, former professor of communications and Director of the Imagining the Internet Center at Elon University, the former director of internet and technology research at Pew Research Center. Under his leadership, the Center has issued more than 800 reports based on its surveys and data-science analyses that examine people’s online activities and the internet’s role in their lives, February 24, 2023, "4. Themes from those who expect tech will be designed to allow humans to control key decision-making," Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2023/02/24/themes-from-those-who-expect-tech-will-be-designed-to-allow-humans-to-control-key-decision-making/

Mark Henderson, professor emeritus of engineering at Arizona State University, wrote, “Science fiction has predicted that technology will surreptitiously take charge of decisions. I see that as a fear-based prediction. I have confidence in human intelligence and humane anticipatory prevention of takeover by either technology or those who want to cause harm. I think most humans would be very troubled by the prospect of machines making decisions over vital human interests such as how health care or other societal goods are allocated. There will undoubtedly be pressure to grant greater decision-making responsibility to machines under the theory that machines are more objective, accurate and efficient. I hope that humans can resist this pressure from commercial and other sources, so that privacy, autonomy and other values are not eroded or supplanted.”

### 1AR---AGI Inevitable

#### AGI inevitable---and AI moves faster than we expect.

Ash Jafari 22, MBA from UC Berkeley, Haas Business School, Former NVIDIA analyst, Facebook PM, and tech entrepreneur featured in CNN, Fortune, USA Today, HuffPost "How far are we from artificial general intelligence (AGI)? The experts weigh in...” 7/7/22, https://aifuture.substack.com/p/how-far-are-we-from-artificial-general

When historians look back at epoch-defining moments in the history of life, they may consider Spring 2022 as the inflection point in AI’s exponential rise. This AI Spring featured a continuous barrage of AI model releases such as DeepMind’s Gopher, Chinchilla, Gato, Google’s PaLM, Imagen, Minerva, and OpenAI’s DALL-E 2. These are just some of the mind-bending highlights.

But where are we on the march to artificial general intelligence (AGI)? How can one judge something that’s so far away, yet getting tantalizingly closer?

Let’s start with the definition of AGI—“the ability to accomplish any cognitive task at least as well as humans.” With this in hand, let’s come back to the question of where we are on the journey to AGI.

Peter Diamandis, a famous serial entrepreneur and founder of the XPrize, has described how he evaluates startup investment opportunities. Peter looks for the “knee bend” in the exponential curve graph.

An AGI graph as of right now may look something like this:

Diagram

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Source: Ash Jafari

Are the incredible achievements of PaLM and Gato at the knee of the curve? Or, are we above or below the knee?

Fortunately, we can consult the AI experts on this. In 2016, a study was commissioned polling experts across the field of AI on their predictions on milestones ranging from an AI mastering Go, writing a novel, and achieving AGI.

The median timeframe for AGI was 2055, but had a wide range from 2030 to 2130.

A picture containing table

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Source: AIimpacts.org

However, AI models have already crushed timelines for various tasks. For example, in 2016, AI experts predicted that the game of Go would not be mastered until 2028. Deepmind’s AlphaGo famously beat one of the best Go players, Lee Sedol, in 2016—eight years earlier than predicted.

What about the harder game of Starcraft where humans reign supreme? Experts predicted human-level performance by 2022. DeepMind’s AlphaStar achieved Grandmaster status in 2019.

Writing a high school essay? Experts predicted that an AI could accomplish such a task by 2026. GPT-3 achieved this feat in 2020. Although GPT-3 essays could contain flaws, its performance is on par with your average American high schooler who might be achieving a C+ in English class.

However, 2016 is ages ago in AI research. Transformer AI models weren’t invented until 2017 and put into wider adoption years following. These models have made a transformative difference on AI performance.

So what do AI experts currently believe?

The leading futurist, Ray Kurzweil, is in a great position to weigh in on this matter. Of his 146 predictions since the 1990s, he boasts a 86% accuracy rate. More importantly, he has been a Director of AI at Google for the past 10 years; he lives and breathes AI.

Amazingly, he made a forecast for AGI in his 1999 book. The year of his prediction: 2029.

Ray recently he spoke to a small group of Singularity University alumni about his timeline saying, “I think we will actually beat 2029”. He also mentioned how the large language model progress has surprised even him. Ray concluded by stating that no big breakthroughs are needed to get to AGI.

What about the man of not-so-few-tweets? Elon Musk recently said he would be surprised if we don’t have AGI by 2029 (tweet from 5/30/22).

Demis Hassabis, founder of DeepMind, said AGI is on the horizon and that no architectural breakthroughs are required, just more engineering and data in his interview with Lex Fridman in June 2022.

Demis believes AGI will occur in the next decade or two (2032-2042). Compare that to his prediction at a conference in 2018, where he believed AGI was several decades away (2048-beyond). Thus, in 4 years he pared down his estimate by 16 years.

Another co-founder of DeepMind, Shane Legg, says he still thinks AGI is 50/50 by 2030.

After the release of Deepmind’s Gato model, their Research Director Nando de Freitas tweeted the controversial statement that “It’s all about scale now! The Game is Over! It’s about making these models bigger, safer, compute efficient, faster at sampling, smarter memory, more modalities, innovative data, on/offline.” Nando implies that no major breakthroughs are needed and that AI is on the horizon, in line with sentiments from Ray Kurzweil and Demis Hassabis.

Eric Schmidt, former Chairman and CEO of Google, said in a Fall 2021 interview that AGI will occur “in the next decade.”

The convergence of these experts hovers around 2029. I would bet the broader AI expert community has a slightly more conservative outlook. If the large survey was to be repeated it would converge to a ~2035 date. That is twenty years earlier than their previous prediction of 2055.

In summary, we are at the knee of the curve and AGI seems more than likely to occur by 2030. We will know if we are at the knee of the exponential curve if achievements in 2023 make the achievements in 2022 seem trivial.

#### Don’t think of AGI as a binary yes-no---human intelligence is a set of characteristics, and AI will continually improve along all of them to the point of AGI

Mostafa H. Chehreghani 22, Assistant Professor at Amirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic), 9/14/22, “The Embeddings World and Artificial General Intelligence,” https://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.06569.pdf

When the field of artificial intelligence first emerged, the original focus of researchers was, however, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). AGI is the ability of machines and computer programs to solve all the tasks that a human being can. Searle [29] is one of the first researchers who makes a distinction between: AGI which implies that the intelligent machine does not simulate a human mind, but actually has a mind and is capable of an intelligence equal or superior to human beings; and narrow AI which implies that a computer program is capable of performing only one specific task or a few relevant tasks1.

From early days, a controversial question inside the AI community was whether AGI is achievable by machines and computer programs. There are several attempts in the literature to answer this question, which can be divided into optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints. A group of researchers, mostly from AI community, believe that achieving AGI is feasible, and try to develop systems or algorithms that realize AGI [19, 10, 23, 3, 32]. While most of well-known algorithms are based on reinforcement learning [19, 10], a few others use probabilistic approaches [23] or deep neural models [3, 32]. However, it is a common belief that we are still far from the point of having systems that realize AGI and work in practice. Even known systems such as XIAI [19] or more recent and improved approaches [10] are not practical. Some other researchers that mostly have a philosophical view to the problem, criticise AGI and believe that due to characteristics that human intelligence has (embodiment, common sense knowledge, tacit and unconscious knowledge etc), it is not possible to develop human-level intelligence for machines and computer programs [29, 13, 14, 15, 34, 27, 11, 17].

However, we believe before trying to answer this question, we should first elaborate on its different aspects. First, AGI should not be seen as an algorithm or a product or a computer program, rather, as a continuous process within agents and systems become more and more intelligent over time, as human intelligence is a continuous process. Second, human intelligence is affected by human’s mental model of the world and as a result, by our world. For example, a characteristic of human intelligence is unconscious knowledge that consists of facts such as ”water always flows downward” [11]. However, such facts are derived from our world and our experiences in this world. So, for example in a world without gravity, this statement would not be a part of human’s unconscious intelligence, but rather some meaningless statement. In a similar way, in order to realize AGI, we first need to build an intelligent world which is on the one hand, an accurate approximation of our world and on the other hand, a significant part of knowledge and reasoning of intelligent machines is already embedded unconsciously in this world. Machines should be able to obtain this unconscious knowledge from this world quickly and with almost no effort. Third, the answer to the above question should not be simply yes or no. It is more reasonable to provide a list of characteristics that human intelligence has, and discuss what characteristics are achievable by machine intelligence and to what extend.

In this paper, we study achievability of AGI, while taking into account these considerations. First, we introduce the notion of embeddings world consisting of pre-trained embeddings of objects, as a trained approximation or abstraction of our world which is proper for machines and computer programs. Embeddings are vectors in a low-dimensional vector space, that represent objects of a domain so that their structural relations are preserved. Pre-trained embeddings are embeddings that are learned and computed usually using a general-purpose objective function. Then, they are stored and can be used, as good quality representations of real objects, to solve several tasks. Second, we argue that along with other techniques such as reinforcement learning that are discussed in the literature, pre-trained embeddings provide a path toward AGI. More precisely, we discuss how pre-trained embeddings facilitate achieving several characteristics of human intelligence, such as embodiment, common sense knowledge, unconscious knowledge, and continuality of learning, by machines.

#### There’s overwhelming expert consensus---processing and memory grow exponentially AND quantum computing overcomes barriers.

Cem Dilmegani 22, Computer engineer from Bogazici University, M.B.A. from Columbia Business School, citing 995 of the foremost artificial intelligence experts in the field, AI Multiple, “When will singularity happen? 995 experts’ opinions on AGI,” updated 6/14/22, https://research.aimultiple.com/artificial-general-intelligence-singularity-timing/

For those who came to get quick answers:

* Will singularity ever happen? According to most AI experts, yes.
* When will the singularity happen? Before the end of the century

The more nuanced answers are below. There have been several surveys and researches of AI scientists asking about when such developments will take place.

Understand results of major surveys of AI researchers in 2 minutes

We looked at the results of 4 surveys with 995 participants where researchers estimated when singularity would happen. In all cases, majority of participants expected AI singularity before 2060.

Chart, bar chart

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In 2009, 21 AI experts participating in AGI-09 conference were surveyed. Experts believe AGI will occur around 2050, and plausibly sooner. You can see above their estimates regarding specific AI achievements: passing the Turing test, passing third grade, accomplishing Nobel worthy scientific breakthroughs and achieving superhuman intelligence.

In 2012/2013, Vincent C. Muller, the president of the European Association for Cognitive Systems, and Nick Bostrom from the University of Oxford, who published over 200 articles on superintelligence and artificial general intelligence (AGI), conducted a survey of AI researchers. 550 participants answered the question: “When is AGI likely to happen?” The answers are distributed as

* 10% of participants think that AGI is likely to happen by 2022
* For 2040, the share is 50%
* 90% of participants think that AGI is likely to happen by 2075.

In 2017 May, 352 AI experts who published at the 2015 NIPS and ICML conferences were surveyed. Based on survey results, experts estimate that there’s a 50% chance that AGI will occur until 2060. However, there’s a significant difference of opinion based on geography: Asian respondents expect AGI in 30 years, whereas North Americans expect it in 74 years. Some significant job functions that are expected to be automated until 2030 are: Call center reps, truck driving, retail sales.

In 2019, 32 AI experts participated in a survey on AGI timing:

* 45% of respondents predict a date before 2060
* 34% of all participants predicted a date after 2060
* 21% of participants predicted that singularity will never occur.

AI entrepreneurs are also making estimates on when we will reach singularity and they are a bit more optimistic than researchers:

* Louis Rosenberg, computer scientist, entrepreneur and writer: 2030
* Patrick Winston, MIT professor and director of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory from 1972 to 1997: He mentioned 2040 while stressing that while it would take place, it is a very hard to estimate date.
* Ray Kuzweil, computer scientist, entrepreneur and writer of 5 national best sellers including The Singularity Is Near : 2045
* Jürgen Schmidhuber,  co-founder at AI company NNAISENSE and director of the Swiss AI lab IDSIA: ~2050

Keep in mind that AI researchers were over-optimistic before

Examples include:

* AI pioneer Herbert A. Simon in 1965: “machines will be capable, within twenty years, of doing any work a man can do.”
* Japan’s Fifth Generation Computer in 1980 had a ten year timeline with goals like “carrying on casual conversations”

This historical experience contributes to most current scientists shying away from predicting AGI in bold time frames like 10-20 years. However, just because they are more conservative now doesn’t mean that they are right this time around.

Understand why reaching AGI seems inevitable to most experts

These may seem like wild predictions, but they seem quite reasonable when you consider these facts:

* Human intelligence is fixed unless we somehow merge our cognitive capabilities with machines. Elon Musk’s neural lace startup aims to do this but research on neural laces is in the early stages.
* Machine intelligence depends on algorithms, processing power and memory. Processing power and memory have been growing at an exponential rate. As for algorithms, until now we have been good at supplying machines with necessary algorithms to use their processing power and memory effectively.

Considering that our intelligence is fixed and machine intelligence is growing, it is only a matter of time before machines surpass us unless there’s some hard limit to their intelligence. We haven’t encountered such a limit yet.

This is a good analogy for understanding exponential growth. While machines can seem dumb right now, they can grow quite smart, quite soon.

If classic computing slows its growth, quantum computing could complement it

Classic computing has taken us quite far. AI algorithms on classical computers can exceed human performance in specific tasks like playing chess or Go. For example, AlphaGo Zero beat AlphaGo by 100-0. AlphaGo had beaten the best players on the earth. However, we are approaching the limits of how fast classical computers can be.

Moore’s law, which is based on the observation that t the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit double about every two years, implies that cost of computing halves approximately every 2 years. However, most experts believe that Moore’s law is coming to an end during this decade. Though there are efforts to keep improving application performance, it will be challenging to keep the same rates of growth.

Quantum Computing, which is still an emerging technology, can contribute to reducing computing costs after Moore’s law comes to an end. Quantum Computing is based on the evaluation of different states at the same time where classical computers can calculate one state at one time. The unique nature of quantum computing can be used to efficiently train neural networks, currently the most popular AI architecture in commercial applications. AI algorithms running on stable quantum computers have a chance to unlock singularity.

### Sustainability---AT: Complexity

#### It’s not that complex

Malte Brosig 19, Associate professor of international relations at University of the Witwatersrand, “Restricted Complexity: A Middle Path between Postmodern Complexity Theory and Positivist Mainstream IR,” in “FORUM: COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE,” International Studies Review (2019) 0, 1–31,

On the one hand, we can hardly reduce social relations to a single or a few parsimonious variables and place them in a deterministic cause-effect relationship in order to build robust theories from these observations. On the other hand, conceptualizing IR as principally consisting of nonlinear relationships in which actorness is only to be found in the system which is self-organizing and in which no prediction over causal relations can be made does not fully match the empirical world. IR can barely be assumed to be completely free from strategic behavior and hierarchical authority, for example, which rests on the assumption that actors as such have ontological bearing and that certain interests and properties they encompass have causal consequences (see, for example, the literature on rising powers).

If linear thinking and complexity are placed in the two opposing camps of positivist and postpositivist orientations, they are easily identified as simply incommensurate approaches with essentially different epistemological foundations: separating explanation from understanding. However, such a separation is rather artificial. Elements of the linear model can be found in complexity approaches. Even complexity theorists who are fundamentally postmodern in orientation, such as Byrne and Callaghan (2014, 19), do not argue in favor of abandoning “law-focused Newtonian science” but question its universal application. Causality and hierarchy do exist in complexity approaches but have seldom taken center stage for complexity theorists as they aimed at being distinct from the traditional linear scientific approach. Causality is still understood as a cause-effect relationship but is nondeterministic and multidirectional. Complex systems produce “multiple but limited sets of possible futures” (Byrne and Callaghan 2014, 176). In this regard they are causally relevant. Complex systems are also assumed to operate and interact with their broader environment, which is not a priori another complex system. If complex systems adapt to their noncomplex environment, they can be a product of linear processes. The idea that complex systems consist of recurring patterns of interaction (feedback loops) also indicates that traces of causal and linear influence can be found even within such systems (Cilliers 1998, 6).

Lastly, complexity approaches often argue that the system properties are not just the result of a simple addition of its parts. This is true especially in relation to key concepts of the theory such as self-organization, emergence, and nonlinearity. But the system cannot exist without its parts (Morin 2007, 7–8). To some degree, the constituent parts within a complex system are treated as nonreducible entities. They simply do exist. However, the important argument is made that our knowledge of these constituent actors is either incomplete or trivial outside of complex systems. Neither can we understand the system without its parts, nor should we aim at separating the parts from the system. In such a relationship, causality exists but not in the classical linear scientific understanding that treats the cause separate from the effect.

Situations in which the effect impacts on the cause are known as endogeneity and are usually seen as problematic and compromising the search for cause-effect relations. However, within social sciences we should critically ask if universally applicable deterministic independent variables do exist, and if they do not, what is framing their effects? Most likely we may find that they operate within a social context from which they are difficult to separate completely. However, it does not follow from this fundamental observation that the search for causality is generally fruitless. In sum, complexity approaches, even when understood as postmodern approaches are using many elements from the linear school. In the end, it is more a mixture of the positivist and postpositivist schools of thinking than an exclusive represention of only either side.

### Sustainability---AT: Disease

#### Growth solves disease.

Ye Fan 23, professor of energy economics and climate economics at Tsinghua University; et al., 2023, “Will the economic growth benefit public health? Health vulnerability, urbanization and COVID‑19 in the USA,” *Annals of Regional Science*, vol. 70, pp. 96-97, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00168-021-01103-9.

In this paper, we first review the articles on the public health effect of economic development, among which we conclude health indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and disease mortality rate are used as major measurements of health outcomes. We summarized the major findings and proposed our hypothesis from a vulnerability perspective that: (1) economic growth leads to lower vulnerability of health; and (2) urbanization increases health vulnerability. To explain the mechanism of this two-sided health effect of economic development, we construct the epidemiological vulnerability index as a dependent variable, and then we use GDP growth rate, urban population, access to health service (hospital beds and active physicians) and population characteristics (density and elderly population) in the model as explanatory variables. EVI’s model fitness is then compared with CDC social vulnerability index (SVI) and COVID-19 data, as EVI includes the preexisting medical conditions and behavioral risk factors, SVI represents potential socioeconomic risk factors for adverse health outcomes, and COVID-19 pandemic represents our model application in a public health crisis. The major findings are: (1) economic growth has a moderately positive effect on lowering the epidemiological vulnerability; (2) urbanization is significantly associated with higher epidemiological vulnerability, especially to highly infectious diseases such as COVID-19. Our results prioritize the need to mitigate health risks brought by urbanization and highlight the importance of including multiple health indicators in economic health studies.

An economically advanced community is less vulnerable to diseases and thus more resilient to health stressors, which is reasonable. However, the positive relationship between urbanization with EVI and SVI indicates a higher risk of developing illnesses and more significant disease burdens, specifically communicable diseases. In the rapid urbanized area, physical environment changes, crowded housing, and air pollution reduced outdoor activities. The high cost of the living, competitive job market, fast-paced lifestyle, and peer pressure contribute to higher risks of smoking, alcohol, and drug abuse. All the factors expose city dwellers to higher risks of injuries, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and mental health issues. What is more, densely populated urban area means a higher chance of exposure to infectious disease, which is well proved by our HIV and COVID-19 data. More frequent human activities contribute to the disease spread. Exacerbated inequity also means it is hard to distribute medical sources equally to the people in need, and it becomes the weakest point of a community’s safety net against infectious diseases. Our next step is to include disparity in our model to explore how it may alter the economic effect on social vulnerability.

### 1AR---Fertility

### 1AR---AT: Insects

#### No insect loss.

Jon Entine 24, Executive Director, Genetic Literacy Project. Former Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, "Are We Facing An ‘Insect Apocalypse’ Caused By ‘Intensive, Industrial’ Farming and Agricultural Chemicals? The Media Say Yes; Science Says ‘No’," Genetic Literacy Project, 04/12/2024, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2024/04/12/are-we-facing-an-insect-armageddon-caused-by-intensive-industrial-farming-and-agricultural-chemicals-the-media-say-yes-science-says-no/. [italics in original]

Insect Armageddon or Apocalypse are now among the most common tropes in science journalism. As I’ve chronicled numerous times in recent years, (including here, here and here), many journalists have echoed claims by environmental activists advancing a succession of insect- and animal-related environmental apocalypse scenarios over the last decade—first honeybees, then wild bees and more recently birds. In each case they fingered modern, intensive farming, particularly crop biotechnology and pesticides, as the culprit, and warned of the terrible consequences in store for the Earth, including the mass extinction of pollinators and the global famine that would surely follow. In each case, small or poorly executed studies predicting imminent catastrophes were ballyhooed by many in the media; in each case, as more research came to light, the hyped claims were eventually retracted or dramatically readjusted.

More recently the spotlight has been turned on insects, the result of a handful of studies that vaulted the issue into global prominence. Is this claim, the plight of insects, an example in which the journalists got it right? We should all be frightened…if there are even a few ounces of truth to the common wisdom presented in the Times’ essay.

Fortunately for planet Earth, Ms. Renkl and the New York Times, again, got it very wrong.

You may not have noticed, as the mainstream news mostly ignored the report, but we finally have comprehensive, competent, non-ideological research to help us assess what up till now has mostly been speculative scenarios and agenda-inspired hyperbole disguised as research. A study by German researchers published in *Science* in April 2020 is now widely accepted—among experts—as the largest and most definitive study to date on the “Insect Apocalypse” scenario.

Researchers at the German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research, Leipzig University and Martin Luther University led by first author Dr. Roel van Klink analyzed almost a century’s worth of data from 166 long-term insect surveys in various parts of the world. While the far-reaching study has certain limitations (which I will address farther on), it needs to be reckoned with by anyone seriously concerned about the ecological future. A short list of the topline findings:

* Overall, terrestrial insects are declining much less rapidly (3 to 6 fold less) than other recent high-profile studies had suggested, and even this likely overstates the trend. Freshwater insect populations are actually increasing.
* “Crop cover,” which means things like corn, soybeans, sorghum, cotton, spring and winter wheat, alfalfa and hay, is associated with increases in insect populations.
* There is no association between insect population trends and global warming.
* The only clear association with insect declines is with urbanization, likely caused by habitat destruction, light pollution and waste pollution.

## Dedev

### No link

#### No financialization. Market is incredibly resilient.

Stephanie Collins 24, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, 12/16/24, OCC Reports on Key Risks in Federal Banking System, https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2024/nr-occ-2024-135.html#:~:text=Continuous%20assessments%20of%20and%20improvements,to%20build%20and%20enhance%20resiliency

WASHINGTON—The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today reported the key issues facing the federal banking system in its Semiannual Risk Perspective for Fall 2024.

The OCC reported that the strength of the federal banking system remains sound. The OCC expects banks to remain diligent and adhere to prudent risk management practices across all risk areas. Continuous assessments of and improvements to risk management practices support banks’ efforts to guard against complacency and to build and enhance resiliency against potential future economic and operational challenges.

The OCC highlighted credit, operational, compliance, and market risks, as the key risk themes in the report. Highlights from the report include:

Commercial credit risk remains moderate and shows signs of stabilizing as risks are better identified, monitored, and controlled. Commercial credit risk drivers indicate the presence of pockets of risk specific to a lender’s region and lending market. The commercial real estate (CRE) office sector remains stressed. Risks in multifamily CRE lending remain elevated, particularly in the luxury segment.

Overall retail credit risk is stable. Delinquency and loss rates on residential real estate-secured loans held by banks remain historically low but are increasing. Delinquencies in other retail asset classes, namely credit cards and auto loans, reflect an increasing trend. However, banks’ retail credit loan performance is consistent with many industry forecasts reflecting delinquency and seasonal loss patterns normalizing from atypical historically low levels.

### Sustainability---1AR

### AT: AI

#### No emerging tech impact.

Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie 23, investigating expert opinions, former professor of communications and Director of the Imagining the Internet Center at Elon University, the former director of internet and technology research at Pew Research Center. Under his leadership, the Center has issued more than 800 reports based on its surveys and data-science analyses that examine people’s online activities and the internet’s role in their lives, February 24, 2023, "4. Themes from those who expect tech will be designed to allow humans to control key decision-making," Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2023/02/24/themes-from-those-who-expect-tech-will-be-designed-to-allow-humans-to-control-key-decision-making/

Humans and tech always positively evolve: The natural evolution of humanity and its tools and systems has always worked out to benefit most people most of the time. Regulation of AI and tech companies, refined design ethics, newly developed social norms and a deepening of digital literacy will emerge.

Businesses will protect human agency because the marketplace demands it: Tech firms will develop tools and systems in ways that will enhance human agency in order to stay useful to customers, to stay ahead of competitors and to assist the public and retain its trust.

The future will feature both more and less human agency, and some advantages will be clear: The reality is that there will always be a varying degree of human agency allowed by tech, depending upon its ownership, setting, uses and goals. Some digital tech will be built to allow for more agency to easily be exercised by some people by 2035; some will not.

Humans and tech always positively evolve

Many of the experts who have hope about the future of human agency noted that throughout history, humans and technology have always overcome significant hurdles. They said societies make adjustments through better regulation, improved design, updating of societal norms and a revamping of education. People tend to adapt to and/or come to accept both the good and the worrisome aspects of technological change. These experts predict this will also be the case as rapidly advancing autonomous systems become more widespread.

Ulf-Dietrich Reips, professor and chair for psychological methods at the University of Konstanz, Germany, wrote, “Many current issues with control of important decision-making will in the year 2035 have been worked out, precisely because we are raising the question now. Fundamental issues with autonomous and artificial intelligence will have come to light, and ‘we’ will know much better if they can be overcome or not. Among that ‘we’ may actually be some autonomous and artificial intelligence systems, as societies (and ultimately the world) will have to adapt to a more hybrid human-machine mix of decision-making. Decision-making will need to be guided by principles of protection of humans and their rights and values, and by proper risk assessment. Any risky decision should require direct human input, although not necessarily only human input and most certainly procedures for human decision-making based on machine input need to be developed and adapted. A major issue will be the trade-off between individual and society. But that in itself is nothing new.”

#### No space war and terrestrial conflict turns it.

Luke Penn-Hall 15, Analyst at The Cipher Brief, M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, B.A. in International Relations and Religious Studies from Claremont McKenna College, “5 Reasons “Space War” Isn’t As Scary As It Sounds”, The Cipher Brief, 8/18/2015, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/5-reasons-%E2%80%9Cspace-war%E2%80%9D-isn%E2%80%99t-scary-it-sounds

The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites. If a less satellite-dependent opponent launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, it would have far greater impact on the U.S. than the attacker. However, it’s not as simple as that – for the following reasons:

1. An ASAT attack would likely be part of a larger, terrestrial attack. An attack on space assets would be no different than an attack on territory or other assets on earth. This means that no space war would stay limited to space. An ASAT campaign would be part of a larger conventional military conflict that would play out on earth.

2. Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs satellites. While the United States is the most dependent on military satellites, most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a vested interest in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely hurt them far more than it would hurt the United States.

3. Destruction of satellites could create a damaging chain reaction. Scientists warn that the violent destruction of satellites could result in an effect called an ablation cascade. High-velocity debris from a destroyed satellite could crash into other satellites and create more high-velocity debris. If an ablation cascade were to occur, it could render certain orbital levels completely unusable for centuries.

4. Any country that threatened access to space would threaten the global economy. Even if a full-blown ablation cascade didn’t occur, an ASAT campaign would cause debris, making operating in space more hazardous. The global economy relies on satellites and any disruption of operations would be met with worldwide disapproval and severe economic ramifications.

5. International Prohibits the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly prohibit signatory nations from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain.

While it remains necessary for military planners to create contingency plans for a, space war it is a highly unlikely scenario. All involved parties are incentivized against attacking. However, if a space war did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth. Those concerned about the potential for war in space should be more concerned about the potential for war, period.

### AT: Insects

#### No insect impact.

Jon Entine 24, Executive Director, Genetic Literacy Project. Former Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, "Are We Facing An ‘Insect Apocalypse’ Caused By ‘Intensive, Industrial’ Farming and Agricultural Chemicals? The Media Say Yes; Science Says ‘No’," Genetic Literacy Project, 04/12/2024, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2024/04/12/are-we-facing-an-insect-armageddon-caused-by-intensive-industrial-farming-and-agricultural-chemicals-the-media-say-yes-science-says-no/. [italics in original]

Insect Armageddon or Apocalypse are now among the most common tropes in science journalism. As I’ve chronicled numerous times in recent years, (including here, here and here), many journalists have echoed claims by environmental activists advancing a succession of insect- and animal-related environmental apocalypse scenarios over the last decade—first honeybees, then wild bees and more recently birds. In each case they fingered modern, intensive farming, particularly crop biotechnology and pesticides, as the culprit, and warned of the terrible consequences in store for the Earth, including the mass extinction of pollinators and the global famine that would surely follow. In each case, small or poorly executed studies predicting imminent catastrophes were ballyhooed by many in the media; in each case, as more research came to light, the hyped claims were eventually retracted or dramatically readjusted.

More recently the spotlight has been turned on insects, the result of a handful of studies that vaulted the issue into global prominence. Is this claim, the plight of insects, an example in which the journalists got it right? We should all be frightened…if there are even a few ounces of truth to the common wisdom presented in the Times’ essay.

Fortunately for planet Earth, Ms. Renkl and the New York Times, again, got it very wrong.

You may not have noticed, as the mainstream news mostly ignored the report, but we finally have comprehensive, competent, non-ideological research to help us assess what up till now has mostly been speculative scenarios and agenda-inspired hyperbole disguised as research. A study by German researchers published in *Science* in April 2020 is now widely accepted—among experts—as the largest and most definitive study to date on the “Insect Apocalypse” scenario.

Researchers at the German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research, Leipzig University and Martin Luther University led by first author Dr. Roel van Klink analyzed almost a century’s worth of data from 166 long-term insect surveys in various parts of the world. While the far-reaching study has certain limitations (which I will address farther on), it needs to be reckoned with by anyone seriously concerned about the ecological future. A short list of the topline findings:

* Overall, terrestrial insects are declining much less rapidly (3 to 6 fold less) than other recent high-profile studies had suggested, and even this likely overstates the trend. Freshwater insect populations are actually increasing.
* “Crop cover,” which means things like corn, soybeans, sorghum, cotton, spring and winter wheat, alfalfa and hay, is associated with increases in insect populations.
* There is no association between insect population trends and global warming.
* The only clear association with insect declines is with urbanization, likely caused by habitat destruction, light pollution and waste pollution.

### AT: Policy Fix

#### Just a demo bad card.

#### Straight turn---both democracy AND state capacity are key.

Sevi Dokuzoğlu 24, Ph. D, Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Finance at Hatay Mustafa Kemal University, has several publications in Web of Science (WoS)-ESCI, Scopus, and TUBITAK-Ulakbim indexed journals, Arif Eser Güzel, June 6th 2024, “Democracy, governance, and environmental policy effectiveness: a cross-country analysis with Sustainable Governance Indicators,” European Journal of Government and Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp 103-119

6. Conclusions

The factors affecting the success of environmental policies are a frequently discussed topic in the literature. At this point, the number of studies investigating the role of democracy and government policies are a frequently discussed topic in the literature. At this point, the number of studies investigating the role of democracy and government effectiveness is limited. In addition, studies investigating the effectiveness of environmental policies in the literature mostly focused on a single environmental degradation indicator. However, the effectiveness of environmental policies is a broader issue. A successfully implemented environmental policy is expected to lead to improvements in many indicators of environmental degradation. Therefore, more comprehensive measurements are needed. In this study, the role of democracy and government quality in environmental policy performance was investigated with the Sustainable Governance Indicators dataset. Empirical results show that both democracy and good governance are positively associated with environmental policy performance, and the relationship is robust under alternative measurements.

According to the empirical results, democracy and the quality of the government have a significant role in the success of environmental policy. Implementing and enforcing environmental policies and ensuring that they are based on community needs and objectives require democratic governance systems and effective government institutions. A more effective democracy will enable individuals and organizations with high environmental awareness in society to express their demands to the government effectively. They can also create political pressure to use public resources to solve environmental problems. Based on the findings, strengthening democratic institutions is recommended. Key stakeholders in the development of democracy are parliaments and governments. Parliaments can contribute to the more effective implementation of environmental policies by creating an institutional structure that will ensure better representation of citizens and promote transparency and accountability. Governments should respond to the democratic demands of voters regarding environmental concerns. They should also improve the quality of governance. Thus, more effective use of public resources in the fight against environmental degradation and climate change can be achieved. Moreover, the rule of law should be established, bureaucratic efficiency should be increased, and corruption should be reduced. These measures reduce the private interest-based actions of politicians and bureaucrats and enable public interest policies, such as reducing environmental degradation, to come to the fore more. Environmental policies combined with good governance can also be implemented more restrictively. In this context, country-specific studies can be conducted to make more specific policy recommendations. Future studies can examine individual environmental policies of countries and conduct comparative analysis following improvements in measurement methods.

#### Prefer studies.

Christian Sander 24, Postdoctoral Associate in Economics at Kiel University, Andrea Schneider, an Associate Professor for Economics at Jönköping International Business School (JIBS), Roxanne Raabe, Research Assistant at Institute for Public and Regional Economics, University of Münster, February 5, 2024, “Public goods and diversity in democracies and non-democracies,” Kyklos, Volume 77, Issue 3, pp. 496–519

We also confront our hypothesis with data on democracies and non-democracies using ethnic fractionalization as a measure for diversity. We utilize recently published data on ethnic fractionalization (Drazanová, ˇ 2020) and a set of different proxies for public goods, namely, government expenses, expenditures on health, life expectancy, and infant mortality, in a panel of 148 countries over the period from 1990 to 2013. When the provision of public goods is proxied by government expenses, expenditures on public health, and life expectancy, we find—in line with our theoretical predictions—a negative association between diversity and the provision of public goods in democracies, whereas we find no or only a weakly significant association between both variables in non-democracies. When we measure public good provision with infant mortality, the associative link does not statistically differ between democracies and non-democracie s

We contribute to the existing literature in two ways. First, we extend the theoretical literature that studies how economic performance is affected by the political system.4 Deacon and Saha (2006) present an overview of the literature on how the provision of public goods differs between democracies and non-democracies.5 In general, there is a consensus that non-democratic governments provide a lower level of public goods. One theoretical argument is centered on the idea that democratic governments need support from a larger part of society than non-democratic regimes and that public goods are a better instrument than private goods for increasing the utility of large groups because of the positive consumption externality related to their provision (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Deacon, 2009). Another argument is based on the different objectives of democratic and non-democratic governments. In McGuire and Olson (1996), the public good does not have a direct effect on utility but contributes to total taxable income. Because the autocrat is only interested in tax revenue while democratic leaders also benefit from after-tax private income, redistribution via public goods is smaller in non-democratic systems. In line with the existing literature, our model predicts that the public good provision is lower in non-democratic than in democratic countries. We extend this strand of the literature by showing that the effect of the political system on the provision of public goods becomes less important in highly diverse societies.

### AT: Trade War

#### Trade prevents war. Studies prove.

Michael Holmes 24, Journalist, Responsible Statecraft. Citing: Dr. Dale Copeland, PhD, Professor, International Relations, University of Virginia, "Why Great Powers Fight, and Why They Cooperate," Responsible Statecraft, 06/17/2024, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/great-powers/.

Copeland’s second key distinction from other schools of realism is his emphasis on the significance of economic relations. He argues that the complex economies of great powers are deeply dependent on vital foreign markets, trade routes and raw materials. Their leaders view access to critical strategic commercial networks as a security necessity. If they anticipate positive trade relations with another nation will continue, they strengthen ties of peaceful cooperation.

However, if they fear losing access to crucial markets, they adopt hardline policies that often lead to war. “This tension between needing to expand one’s economic sphere of influence and wanting to avoid an escalatory spiral that might restrict access to vital markets is baked into the DNA of modern great power politics,” he says.

“Economic Interdependence and War” convincingly demonstrates that dynamic realism surpasses all other theories of international relations in explanatory power. Copeland shows that “in thirty of the forty case periods, economic interdependence played a moderate to strong causal role.” Trade expectations often mattered when we least expected it. Japan tried hard to make peace with the U.S. until 1941, when the U.S. embargo pushed its leaders into a desperate attempt to secure the nation’s survival through conquest and war.

Pessimistic trade expectations also exacerbated German fears of encirclement, which partially explain both world wars.

Copeland explores how regime type, interest groups and psychology shape great power dynamics, despite his conviction that domestic factors rarely serve as the primary cause of war. Ideological divides sparked the French revolutionary wars and intensified the Cold War. Nationalism drove the German and Italian wars of unification.

Copeland discusses statistical studies indicating that democracies are less likely to engage in conflict with one another only if both are developed nations. He suggests that developed nations are better positioned to cultivate strong trade ties. This perspective overlooks a crucial explanation highlighted by Jack Levy and William Thompson in their fact-filled book “The Arc of War” — developed states increase both the costs of war and the benefits of trade for every other nation.

As a result, developed nations are highly motivated to avoid conflict with each other. Although highly developed democracies and autocracies have frequently waged asymmetric wars against weaker opponents, the absence of war between them since 1945 offers hope that a stable peace among major powers is achievable.

#### Empirical AND statistical ev is Aff. The pacifying effect of trade is robust.

Johan Norberg 22, MA, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, "Free Trade Still Promotes Peace, Despite Putin’s Reckless War," Cato Institute, 04/29/2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/free-trade-still-promotes-peace-despite-putins-reckless-war. [italics in original]

We are in the longest stretch of peace between major powers for 1,800 years, the old archenemies France and Germany almost cozy up too much to one another, and Putin’s invasion is the first attempt to launch a major war of conquest since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. In a world where peace used to be just a brief interlude while everybody rearmed, something has gone right in the post–World War II era. If you want the whole story, read Steven Pinker’s *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, but clearly doux commerce has something to do with it.

Proximity and interdependence are not always deterrents, especially if different groups share one pool of resources that they all want the largest share of. Additionally, not all cultures and communities are happily harmonious, and civil wars are often the most vicious. However, the general relationship between trade and peace is a strong one.

By analyzing thousands of country pairs over several decades, many researchers have found that increasing trade between two countries lowers the risk of war between them. They have also found that countries that are more dependent on international trade have fewer conflicts than self-reliant ones, which provides us all with a security interest in other countries’ global integration as well.

It’s not just trade though; it’s free trade. A series of statistical analyses by the political scientist Patrick McDonald show that the level of free trade between two countries has a larger effect on peace. Countries that engage in free trade are less likely to attack or be attacked than protectionist countries. Free trade removes the barriers and privileges that enhance the domestic power of groups that generally support authoritarian leaders and an aggressive foreign policy.

It has long been known that democracies are more peaceful. According to McDonald’s study, the risk of a war between two countries is reduced by almost 30 percent if they move from little democracy to the highest level of democracy. But in fact, liberal, capitalist peace is even more powerful than democratic peace. If two countries move to the highest level of free trade, the risk of war is reduced by as much as 70 percent. Forget about the golden arches, this is the real McDonald’s theory of peace.

In an era of decoupling and trade wars, there are other authoritarian powers, like China, worth worrying about. It’s not just current trade relations that inform decisions over war and peace but also expectations of future relations. The historical pattern is that countries that expect the international order will stay open mostly prefer to be at peace with it, to reap the rewards, but when they feel that it is closing time, they start fearing the loss of access to resources and markets. Some even go to war to secure them.

If authoritarians lose all commercial, cultural, and personal relationships with the outside world, they have nothing left to lose. They are suddenly free to act according to their own character. And that is scary.

If goods cross borders, it might not always stop soldiers from doing so. But if goods suddenly stop moving across borders, history suggests that soldiers won’t be far behind.

### Transition Fails---1AR

#### 3. INEVITABLE. Growth is locked-in.

Milena Büchs and Max Koch 19, Dr Milena Buchs is an environmental social scientist and specialises on sustainable welfare and wellbeing, Max Koch is Professor in the School of Social Work at Lund University, “Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing,” Futures, Volume 105, January 2019, Pages 155-165, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715

The satisfaction of needs is influenced by the character of socio-economic institutions, including the ways in which work, welfare, retirement, health, education and family life are governed; as well as by the structure of the distribution of a range of resources that support health and wellbeing. Welfare state institutions play an important role in these areas in high income economies, and they are closely coupled with economic growth (Bailey, 2015). Rising economic prosperity in the post Second World War period provided the resources for establishing welfare states in Europe and elsewhere, and the funding of current welfare state institutions is closely coupled to economic growth as it largely depends on income-related taxes and social security contributions. The positive relationship between economic growth and welfare states in many ways also works the other way round: welfare states support growth by enhancing the population’s health and education levels, providing unemployment and minimum income benefits for people out of work. This helps to increase productivity, maintain consumer demand, and more generally contain and minimise social conflict through redistribution and institutionalised conflict resolution between employers and employees.

Evidently, a fundamental reorganisation of the economic and welfare system would be required under degrowth to sustain investments in health, education, and the reduction of poverty and inequality. This will be crucial in a context of decreasing material and financial resources, because if left unmanaged, this could provide fertile ground for new social conflicts with potentially detrimental implications for wellbeing. Various degrowth authors have made suggestions for alternative welfare institutions and policies, including working time reduction and redistribution as mentioned above (Victor & Rosenbluth, 2007), a basic income (Gorz, 1980; Dietz & O’Neill, 2013: 94), and, from a Marxian perspective, the establishment of a cooperative economy in which businesses will be worker-owned and managed (Blauwhof, 2012). These are all relevant suggestions, however, it should not be underestimated how radical the changes to existing social systems are that these new institutions represent. They challenge deeply entrenched ways of thinking about rights, justice, freedom, private property, individual responsibility, etc. A change of these deeply rooted ‘logics’ on which these institutions are based is not impossible, but very difficult to steer with political means.

This point closely links to the idea that economic growth is not only at the core of various socio-economic institutions but is also very deeply anchored in people’s minds, bodies and identities which is likely to make the transition to degrowth additionally challenging. The concept of social practices helps us understand the ways in which agents (and their mind-sets and bodies) and broader social structures are continuously implicated and reproduced in the performance of social life (Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6). From this perspective, economic growth is not just an external premise that actors can decide to act upon or not, but it is a principle with structural properties that is engrained in ways of thinking and acting – for the most part habitually. Growth thus becomes something that is perceived as ‘natural’ by the vast majority of actors. A range of scholars have argued that the growth paradigm is deeply embedded in people’s minds and bodies (Göpel, 2016; Lane, 1991; Welzer, 2011; Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6). This implies that people’s identities and life goals are closely aligned with the idea of growth – shaped by ideas of social progress, personal status and success through careers, rising income and consumption. Even seemingly alternative goals such as ‘personal fulfilment’ can be infused with ideas that remain tied to the growth paradigm, for instance if fulfilment is sought through high consumption and high emissions practices such as extensive long haul travel or expensive hobbies and gadgets. As Meadows (1999) has pointed out, the most effective, but also the most difficult step in system transformation is the shift of paradigms that underpin the system. Again, since this is difficult to influence politically, it presents a major hurdle for a departure from growth-based systems that also maintains wellbeing.

#### Empirics.

Manuel Funke and Christoph Trebesch 17, both work at the Institute for the World Economy, “Financial Crises and the Populist Right,” ifo DICE Report, December 2017, https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-funke-trebesch-december.pdf

EUROPE SINCE 2008: RIGHT-WING POPULISM ENTERS THE CORE

In terms of right-wing populism, the European experience after the crash of 2008 has been strikingly similar to that of the more idiosyncratic, country-specific crises of the 1990s. Figure 2 shows the vote shares of right-wing populists in three consecutive general elections after the Lehman collapse of September 15, 2008 (focusing on lower house results in bicameral systems). It is evident that right-wing populist parties found themselves in a considerably better position after 2008 than before. On average, the vote share of right-wing populists was about 5% prior to the crisis. Two elections later, however, their average vote share had climbed to double-digit levels (between 10% and 20%), resulting in significantly higher levels of parliamentary representation. Thus, similar to the evidence from the 1990s right-wing populist parties advanced from the political fringe to the centre of the political arena.

Established right-wing populist parties also capitalized on the crisis. The Freedom Party of Austria improved its vote share from 11.0% in 2006 to 20.5% in 2013 and now has hopes of entering government after the upcoming election in late 2017. Similarly, the Norwegian Progress Party reached an all-time high in 2009 (22.9%) and in 2013 became part of the government coalition, while the Danish People’s Party went from 13.8% in 2007 to 21.1% in 2015. Mature rightwing populist parties in Eastern Europe exhibit similar patterns. For example, the Hungarian Fidesz re-entered government in 2010, after the vote share had increased to a record 53.7% in 2007. Likewise, the Polish Law and Justice grew from 32.1% in 2007 to 37.6% in 2015, when it formed a majority government.

Last but not least, we observe the emergence of new right-wing parties. Since 2008, several European countries have witnessed the creation of entirely new right-wing populist parties; and some of these newcomers managed to enter national parliaments in record time. Notable examples of newly founded right-wing entrants include the People’s Party in Belgium (after the 2010 election), the Independent Greeks (2012 election), Brothers of Italy (2013 election), Dawn in the Czech Republic (2013 election), Team Stronach in Austria (2013 election), Kukiz’15 in Poland (2015 election) and more recently, the Alternative for Germany (2017 election), whose latest electoral success is also shown in Figure 2.

The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis can thus be characterized by a “rise of the right” in several dimensions. Parties that were inexistent or largely unknown prior to 2008 were propelled into the political mainstream. This is also true for a subset of countries like Germany, Finland and Britain that had been largely immune to populist politics for decades. Moreover, in those countries where right-wing populism was already strong to start with, the vote shares of populist forces increased further, thus facilitating their entry into government.

## Buddhism K

### Falsifaibility---1AR

### AT: desireless

### Framework---1AR

### Resolved = formal vote

#### ‘Resolved’ is formal vote.

Merriam-Webster 25, "Resolve," Merriam-Webster, 11/20/2025, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve.

resolved; resolving

Synonyms of *resolve*

*transitive verb*

1 a : to deal with successfully : clear up

*resolve* doubts

*resolve* a dispute

b : to find an answer to

c : to make clear or understandable

d : to find a mathematical solution of

e : to split up into two or more components especially in assigned directions

*resolve* a vector

2 : to reach a firm decision about

*resolve* to get more sleep

*resolve* disputed points in a text

3 a : to declare or decide by a formal resolution and vote

#### Should’ means future action

AHD 2k – American Heritage Dictionary Online

should    ( P )  Pronunciation Key  (shd)  
aux.v. Past tense of shall

Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note.

#### We turn value ethics.

Paul Conway 18, Assistant Professor at the University of Western Ontario and Post-doctoral Fellow at the University of Cologne, Joshua D. Greene, Professor of Psychology, a member of the Center for Brain Science faculty, David Polacek, Bachelor’s degree in Psychology from Florida State University, October 2018, “Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers”, Cognition, Volume 179.

However, both of these claims rest upon research employing conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas that pit concerns about causing harm against concerns for the greater good. Such analyses remain ambiguous with respect to people’s motivations and traits. Level-1 utilitarian responses on conventional dilemmas may reflect either prosocial tendencies, a relatively strong desire to promote the greater good, or antisocial tendencies, a relatively weak desire to avoid harming people. Conventional analyses cannot distinguish between these possibilities. Thus, although evidence abounds that utilitarian sacrificial judgments are associated with antisocial traits (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Patil, & Silani, 2014; Miller et al., 2014), it remains unclear whether such findings truly reflects the psychology involved in maximizing good outcomes, or simply the absence of concerns about causing harm.

Moreover, further evidence is required to support the stronger claim that sacrificial judgments do not reflect prosocial tendencies—an argument based on null findings. Although null findings can indicate the absence of the effect, they can also result from suppression—the case where two same-direction effects cancel out when pitted against one another. There are reasons to believe that just such a suppression effect may occur for the relationship between measures of prosociality and conventional dilemma judgments. For example, Conway and Gawronski (2013) found that moral identity internalization positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological response tendencies, which cancelled out for relative judgments. Reynolds and Conway (2018) found a similar pattern for aversion to witnessing others’ suffering, and many other papers have documented simultaneous influences on dilemma responding that remain invisible to conventional dilemma analyses (e.g., Conway, Weiss, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2018; Muda, Niszczota, Bialek, & Conway, 2017). Therefore, conventional analyses may underestimate the extent to which sacrificial utilitarian judgments reflect prosocial motivations.3

### Framework---AT: Defense

### Reincarnation---1AR

#### Reincarnation is bunk

David McAfee & Yvette d’Entremont 17, David G. McAfee is author of Atheist Answers: Rational Responses to Religious Questions, Mom, Dad, I’m an Atheist: The Guide to Coming Out as a Nonbeliever, and Disproving Christianity and Other Secular Writings, also coauthor of two books for children, The Belief Book and The Book of Gods, He holds a degree in religious studies from the University of California-Santa Barbara and lives in Southern California, “No Sacred Cows: Investigating Myths, Cults, and the Supernatural,” Pitchstone Publishing (US&CA), 08/22/2017

Religious karma is not only more complicated than the New Age version, it’s also more harmful. For instance, a literal application of karma means that believers could witness a young child experiencing something terrible and, instead of helping, they may assume the victim deserves it based on something he or she did in an unknown “past life.” Karma is a completely unfalsifiable idea that is incredibly susceptible to dangerous assumptions and intentional fraud because it relies on information from reincarnation, which itself has never been shown to exist. Reincarnation posits that a soul begins a new life in a new body after biological death and, like most supernatural concepts, it is a byproduct of humanity’s wishful thinking. We are aware of our own mortality and the mortality of our loved ones and, as a result, we seek ways to live on—even if it’s in another form. We make up stories that are passed down from generation to generation, but that can’t be verified or proven. This is a common thread that ties together heavens, hells, reincarnation, ghosts, spirits, and more.

REBIRTH AND REINCARNATION

A number of people from various time periods and cultures, including North American Indians,3'' ancicnt Greeks,39 and more, have professed a belief in reincarnation—and that’s not surprising. In fact, I understand why the idea of reincarnation, or rebirth, is popular. As a metaphor, it’s poetic, comforting, and “can prove useful in grappling with our lives," according to author Derek Beres. u

Rites of passage ami overcoming personal trauma are great examples of how one can be rebirthedhe wrote for Big Think,40 adding that there is no scientific evidence to suggest reincarnation is a real phenomenon. “ When treated as a ‘science,’ reincarnation is a relic of our primitive past that we cannot seem to evolve beyond. Still, our spiritual traditions cling to this archaic idea by pretending a discipline ill-suited for such topics provides 'proof of transmigration."

The most common “evidence" put forth for reincarnation is people, especially young children, who say they are able to recount their so-called past lives. There are numerous examples of well-publicized stories with this theme, including Luke Ruehlman, a five-year-old Caucasian boy whose parents say he used to be an African-American woman named Pamela Robinson,41 and Ryan Hammons, a young boy from Oklahoma whose mother claims he was a movie extra named Marty Martyn.42 But none have produced evidence for anything beyond vivid imaginations in children and the fact that their families can use Google. While admittedly imaginative, these kids have never shown any data definitively pointing to reincarnation as a fact, and their anecdotes should not be confused for scientific evidence. That’s not to say, however, that it would be impossible to prove reincarnation was real. 1 only mean to suggest that proof would come through scientific research, and not the retelling of vague stories.

Ignoring for a moment that the numbers of humans, and life forms in general, have been in a constant state of flux for millions of years, let's consider the possibility that one death is equal to one birth, with “souls" flowing in between. How would we show this to be true? In order to present the past life “memories” as evidence, one would need to study the subjects in a controlled, scientific environment—a relatively easy task. The researcher would then have to verify information that couldn’t possibly have come from any other source. If a child was said to be able to speak in a language that he or she has never encountered, for instance, the scientist would be required to validate the claim and investigate possible natural explanations to rule them out entirely. Those studying subjects with alleged recollections of past lives would be forced to find empirical data that both showed that the stories were true (i.e., the information was not discovered through other methods) and demonstrated how rebirth works in the real world before they could proclaim the phenomenon is the result of human “spirits” being passed into new bodies. In short, simply noting that there is a child who has a memory of some perceived (yet vague) previous life, or a birthmark similar to one of a deceased person, is not good enough.

Many scientists have tried to prove the reincarnation hypothesis, including University of Virginia psychiatry' professor Jim B. Tucker, whose work is based partly on cases accumulated by his predecessor Ian Stevenson.4' These researchers have uncovered some interesting and unexplained cases of children with perceived knowledge of the past that wouldn't be easily obtained, but they have fallen short of proving the existence of reincarnation. Still, serious scientific inquiries into the matter have been hailed by skeptics. Carl Sagan, for instance, referred to childhood past-life memories in The Demon-Haunted World as one of three claims in the ESP field that “deserve serious study.” и Sam Harris, the neuroscientist and author who thoroughly debunked the NDE claims of neurosurgeon Eben Alexander,b also referred to Stevenson’s work in his book, End of Faith. In a footnote, Harris states that there “may even be some credible evidence for reincarnation." So, what did Stevenson, Tucker, and others discover? Not much. They have raised some interesting questions, but there are several problems with their research and they haven’t demonstrated the validity of past lives. According to Jonathan Edelmann, an assistant professor of religion at the University of Florida, and William Bernet, a professor of psychiatry at Vanderbilt Kennedy Center, there are “a number of weaknesses with the current methodology used by parapsychologists to study reincarnation claims."

“Considering that many reincarnation cases occur in countries in which belief in reincarnation is part of the cultural matrix, the possibility of interpreting otherwise normal information in light of reincarnation is very strong" Edelmann and Bernet wrote in Setting Criteria for Ideal Reincarnation Research, a paper in which they outline a “rigorous and large-scale reincarnation experiment” that would ideally settle the debate.16

"In most cases, the child was not interviewed so as to exclude the possibility of familial and/or interviewer suggestion, nor in such a way that allows other researchers to observe the interview itself,” the authors wrote. “Generally, the child was present at the time his statements were validated at the designated household, thus introducing the possibility that suggestion occurred.”

The most telling piece of the past life puzzle of all, I think, is that Stevenson, who collected more than 2,500 reincarnation experience stories, failed to convince himself of his own claims. Prior to his death, Stevenson declined to answer whether he believed in reincarnation, stating instead that he and his colleagues have given “some support to a belief in reincarnation.”

“Before the modern investigations a belief in reincarnation had to rest on the basis of faith, usually inculcated by the scriptures or oral teachings of a traditional religion. Now, one may, if one wishes, believe in reincarnation on the basis of evidence,” Stevenson wrote.47 “However, the evidence is not ﬂawless and it certainly does not compel such a belief. Even the best of it is open to alternative interpretations, and one can only censure those who say there is no evidence whatever.”

The scientific consensus is important, but nonscientists who believe in reincarnation can also collect data in hopes of confirming or dismissing their own ideas and I encourage them to do so. If you believe psychics can uncover past lives, for instance, I recommend you perform a simple test by locating two independent mediums who you think can do it and then challenging them, separately, to describe the life the subject lived during a scientific time period. Once you check their stories against one another, you’ll have your answer. Needless to say, no so-called rebirth memory has ever held up under serious scientific scrutiny, and most are the result of human imagination, memory and confirmation biases, and/or outright fraud.

The bottom line is that there’s no objective or scientific reason to believe that people are reincarnated, just as no such evidence exists for karma, gods, psychics, good and bad luck, etc. Karma and reincarnation are interesting ideas in certain contexts, but there isn’t compelling evidence supporting them and they are, at their cores, a lot like other punishment/reward systems established by other faiths. For example, a Christian who believes in Original Sin might think people deserve negative outcomes because of their ancestors’ actions, while, if you believe in karma/reincarnation, you may accept that people deserve horrible things in this life because of their behavior in “past lives ” In each case, basing actions on an afterlife that can’t be proven allows some otherwise rational people to act without considering earthly consequences. Beres says reincarnation, while an “attractive idea” can become a dangerous and distracting belief when it alters a person’s perception of this world—the only one we know exists.

“That we only get one pass on this giant Ferris wheel can be cause for depression. Yet time and again, when exploring the numerous modalities of rebirth, from the law of karma to the hope of a better world beyond this one, we stumble into one glaring recurrence: By entertaining such philosophies, we inevitably waste valuable time wishing things here were different,” Beres wrote. “Instead of changing our circumstances (or our attitude towards existence), we project our attention to some future destination."

#### BUT, even on Buddhist assumptions, extinction is samsarically futile AND hurts conditions for practice

Calvin Baker 22, Ph.D. student at Princeton University, former researcher at Stanford University, Chappell Lougee Scholar at Stanford University, “Buddhism and Effective Altruism,” Effective Altruism and Religion: Synergies, Tension, Dialogue, 2022, pp. 17–45

It is nonetheless productive to consider the ideal Buddhist society, for it serves as a further counterpoint to EA. In the short and medium run, Buddhists working to establish the ideal Buddhist society and EAs might share and even collaborate on goals such as improving global health and putting an end to factory farming. Such Buddhists might even adopt the EA priority of minimizing existential risk, not to prolong existence in sam. sāra for its own sake, but to preserve a set of conditions that was unusually conducive to awakening. After all, on Buddhist assumptions, an existential catastrophe on Earth would simply result in Earth’s inhabitants being reborn elsewhere in samsāra, so there is no reason Buddhists would welcome such an event. (Extinction, whether voluntary or not, also suffers from the samsāric futility problem.) Rather, although Buddhists hold that all societal conditions are ultimately impermanent, they accept that certain conditions are more conducive to successful Buddhist practice than others. Relative to the end of awakening, Buddhists therefore have instrumental reason to maintain propitious societal conditions to whatever extent possible.